A method is proposed for constructing from interactive protocols digital signature schemes secure against adaptively chosen message attacks. Our main result is that practical secure signature schemes can now also be based on computationally di cult problems other than factoring (see 9]), such as the discrete logarithm problem.
Introduction
This paper deals with the construction of secure signature schemes. By "secure", we mean that some well-de ned computational assumption can be shown to be su cient for the scheme not to be existentially forgeable, even under an adaptive chosen message attack. This notion of optimal security was introduced in 9]. Most, if not all, signature schemes used in practice such as ISO9796/RSA or DSA are based on a computational assumption that is certainly necessary for this kind of security, but not known to be su cient.
Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest 9] were the rst to nd a provably secure signature scheme, based on the existence of claw-free pairs of trapdoor oneway permutations. Merkle 11] showed essentially that existence of collision intractable hash functions is a su cient assumption. Naor and Yung showed that any one-way permutation is also enough 12], and nally this was reduced to any one-way function (which is also a necessary assumption) by Rompel 14] .
Although secure signature schemes are generally less e cient than the ones used in practice, the e ciency of the GMR scheme is not too bad when based on factoring, and by relying on the (perhaps) stronger assumption that RSA is hard to invert, Bos and Chaum 2] have been able to build an even more e cient secure scheme.
Recently, Dwork and Naor 5] have exhibited an e cient and secure signature scheme whose security is also equivalent to the di culty of RSAinversion. In contrast with other schemes that use authentication trees, such as 9], they are able to re-use the authenticating nodes many times. As a result of this and further exploitations of the speci c properties of the RSA functions, the length of their signatures can be made quite small, although a price has to be paid in the form of a large public le.
On the theoretical side, the reduction in the necessary assumptions by 11], 12] and 14] have come at the price of dramatically reduced e ciency. In particular, signatures have become larger. Where a GMR signature is of length O(k) bits, where k is the security parameter (ignoring here any dependency on the number of messages signed), a Naor-Yung signature would typically be of length O(k 2 ) bits, because a full preimage under a one-way function is required to authenticate 1 bit.
Thus it has been an open question whether secure signatures with eciency comparable to or better than that of GMR could be based on more general assumptions than claw-free pairs of trapdoor one-way permutations.
In this paper, we show that secure signature schemes with signatures as short as those of GMR can be built if so called signature protocols exist. In particular, our schemes have the same property as GMR that the length of signatures grow logarithmically with the number of messages signed. Note that Goldreich 8] has shown that the GMR scheme can be modi ed so that all signatures have length O(k log k) bits. This same modi cation applies to our scheme as well.
Dropping some technical details, a signature protocol is an interactive protocol for a hard problem that uses three messages, where the prover speaks rst and the veri er sends a random challenge as the second message. The essential properties are
The protocol must be secure (zero-knowledge) against the honest verier. The challenge must be longer than the prover's rst message. It must be infeasible for a cheating prover to answer more than one challenge in a given protocol execution. We show that it is su cient for the existence of signature protocols that one-way group homomorphisms exist. This has a nice theoretical consequence, because it shows that, compared to GMR, the trapdoor property can be traded for the homomorphism property without getting longer signatures. Moreover, our construction allows us, in both signature generation and veri cation, to minimize the number of evaluations of the one-way function and replace them by evaluations of the group operation in the the groups involved. This means that we can use the discrete logarithm assumption as a basis for secure signatures in a much more e cient way than known before. Where earlier methods would, with security parameter k, require )), depending on the protocol used.
Signature Protocols
This section is devoted to de ning the basic building block, a signature protocol, that is used in our construction for secure signatures.
Let P be a three round public coin protocol where the prover speaks rst. Figure 1 depicts the kind of protocol we will look at. It resembles a proof of knowlege for a binary relation R (see for instance 6] for details), in that the prover can always make the veri er accept on common input x, if the prover knows w such that (x; w) 2 R.
Indeed, by running (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm P a on x and his secret witness w, the prover P computes his initial message a, and some (secret) auxiliary information aux(a). The length of this rst message a is denoted A P , the authentication length, which only depends on x. After having received a, the veri er V chooses a challenge c uniformly at random, and sends it to P. The length of admissible challenges in P is called the challenge length C P (we will sometimes abuse this notation to refer to the set of possible challenges). Also here, it is assumed to depend only on x. The prover P completes the conversation by running (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm P r on x, w, a, c, and, the auxiliary information aux(a) for 4 a. The resulting response r is submitted to the veri er V . We will assume that the procedure that the veri er V invokes to test the validity of the conversation, is a polynomial time algorithm. The collection of all possible accepting conversations with respect to x will be denoted Acc(x). For the rest of this paper, P will denote a protocol as described above.
For the purpose of constructing secure signature schemes, the protocol P does not, however, have to satisfy the ordinary soundness condition. Instead, we require the following.
De nition 1 Let k be a security parameter for protocol P. Suppose we are given a probabilistic polynomial time generator G for relation R that on input 1 k produces (x; w) 2 R, such that no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, given x as input, can generate two accepting conversations (with respect to x) (a; c; r), (a; c 0 ; r 0 ) from Acc(x), with c 6 = c 0 , except with negligible probability of success. Then P is called collision intractible over G. Next, we need the protocol P to be secure in the following sense. Instead of requiring the protocol to be zero-knowledge against an arbitrary veri er, we only demand that conversations with an honest veri er (i.e., a veri er who follows protocol P as desired) can be simulated. Additionally, we require that the simulator outputs accepting conversations where the challenge can be chosen in advance, i.e., the simulator can take any value c as input, and will output an accepting conversation where the challenge is equal to c. A protocol P satisfying these conditions will be called special honest veri er zero-knowledge.
More precisely, let (x; w) 2 R and let a prover P and a veri er V with common input x be given. The prover has w as private input. Then P(x;w) denotes the probability distribution on Acc(x) induced by conversations between P and V , provided that they both follow protocol P honestly. We require the following.
De nition 2 Let (x; w) 2 R. Suppose we are given a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm S with the following properties.
1. On input x and any c 2 C P , S outputs an accepting conversation from Acc(x).
2. The distribution of S(x;c), where c is chosen uniformly at random from C P , is equal to P(x;w).
Then P is called special honest veri er zero knowledge, and S its special simulator.
In the following we will demonstrate that a protocol P that is special honest veri er zero-knowledge, is in fact secure against a slightly more general veri er. It follows immediately from De nition 2 that, for each xed c 2 C P , S(x;c) outputs conversations (a; c; r) 2 Acc(x) with exactly the same distribution as (a P a (x; w); c; r P r (x; w; a; aux(a); c)), i.e., according to the honest prover who has access to (x; w). Therefore, it is su cient that challenges c are independently chosen from the rst message in any given execution of P, in order for the conversations to be simulatible. In other words, c may depend on anything (including the history of executions, x, etc.) but the prover's rst message a in the given execution, and the conversation is still simulatible. This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If e
V is any probabilistic polynomial time veri er who, in any given execution of protocol P, chooses the challenge c independently from the prover's rst message a, then the conversation between prover P and veri er V can be simulated by means of the special simulator S. Summarizing, we require the following of our protocol P in order for it to support our construction of (non-interactive) secure signature schemes.
De nition 3 Suppose P satis es the following conditions.
1. C P > A P .
2. P is collision-intractible over G. 3. P is special honest veri er zero-knowledge. Then P is called a signature protocol. If P satis es the second condition and is honest veri er zero-knowledge (so it does not necessarily have a special simulator), P is called a quasi signature protocol.
We now demonstrate that any given signature protocol P can be transformed into a new signature protocol P where the challenge length C P can be of any size polynomial in the security parameter k. 6 Theorem 2 Suppose there exists a signature protocol P for relation R and generator G, then there is a signature protocol P for R and G, satisfying that C P = t, for any t polynomial in the security parameter k.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we may assume that A P + 1 = C P The protocol P goes as follows:
1. The prover sends a rst message a to the veri er, where a is computed as in P.
2. The veri er sends t random bits b 1 ; : : :; b t . i ) in P with respect to x. Therefore, P is collision-intractible over R and G.
As for special honest veri er zero-knowledge of P , we now exhibit a special simulator S for P , that runs S as a subroutine. S starts by receiving a public string x and a challenge (b 1 ; : : :; b t ) as input. It proceeds by putting c t = b t jj0jj jj0, and feeding x and c t to S. After S has output an accepting conversation (a t ; c t ; r t ) in P with respect to x, S repeats the following for i = t?1 : : : 1. Put c i = b i jja i+1 , feed x and c i to S and receive an accepting conversation (a i ; c i ; r i ) from S. By invoking Theorem 1, it is clear that S generates accepting conversations in P with respect to x, with exactly the same distribution as the conversations with the honest veri er in P .
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Thus, in the constructions to follow, whenever we have a signature protocol, we may assume that the challenge length is whatever we need it to be.
Before investigating under which general assumptions signature protocols can be shown to exist, we mention some examples of proofs of knowledge that can be viewed as signature protocols.
Guillou-Quisquater 10]. Okamoto 13] , both the factoring and the RSA-versions. Fiat- Shamir 7] (if the number of secret roots is chosen su ciently large) Schnorr's discrete log protocol 15] does not directly satisfy the conditions, but can be modi ed to do so since it is based on a one-way group homomorphism (see below).
2. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which on input 1 k outputs an element f : G ! H chosen uniformly from F, subject to k = k f .
3. The elements f : G ! H 2 F satisfy that there is a probabilistic algorithm which given G outputs an element chosen uniformly from G, in time polynomial in k. 4 . The one-way property: Let A be any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which receives input f and f(w), where f; w are chosen as in points 2 and 3. Then the probability that A outputs y such that f(y) = f(w) is superpolynomially small in k.
5. The elements f : G ! H 2 F satisfy that group operation and inversion in G and H can be computed in time polynomial in k. An example of such a family could be the case where the homomorphisms are discrete exponentiation modulo a prime, i.e. each element f : G ! H is described by a k-bit prime p and an element g 2 Z p . G is the additive group modulo p?1, H is the multiplicative group modulo p, and f(w) = g w mod p.
Given a family as in this de nition, we can make a binary relation and a generator for it:
De nition 5 Let F be as in De nition 4. Then R F is the binary relation consisting of pairs ((f; x 1 ; : : :; x k f +1 ); (w 1 ; : : : ; w k f +1 )), where f 2 F and f(w i ) = x i . G F is the generator that on input 1 k generates f using property 2 of De nition 4, generates w 1 ; : : :; w k f +1 using property 3 and nally computes x i = f(w i ).
Theorem 3 Suppose F is a family of one-way group homomorphisms. Then there exists a signature protocol for R F and G F .
Proof: The protocol claimed takes f; x 1 ; : : :; x k+1 as common input, while w 1 ; : : : ; w k+1 are private input to the prover. The protocol is now a straightforward generalization of Feige-Fiat- Shamir 7] and goes as follows:
1. The prover chooses a random r 2 G and sends f(r) to the veri er.
2. The veri er chooses bits e 1 ; : : : ; e k+1 at random and sends them to the prover. This protocol is clearly complete with probability 1. Honest veri er zero knowledge is clear by standard arguments: rst choose z and e 1 ; : : :; e k+1 at random, then use this to compute an f(r)-value. It is also clear that the challenge is one bit longer than the rst message from the prover. Thus, only the collision intractable property remains to be argued: So assume by contradiction that some enemy A can produce z; z 0 and (e 1 ; : : :; e k+1 ) 6 = (e 0 where all d i are 1, ?1 or 0, and at least one of them is non-zero.
We can then build the following algorithm which will invert f with the help of A: given a random f-image x, generate an output seemingly coming from G F as follows: choose w 1 ; : : :; w k+1 and 1 j k + 1 at random.
Put x i = f(w i ) for i 6 = j, and x j = f(w j ) x. Now run A's algorithm with f and the x i 's as input. Clearly the set of x i is distributed exactly as output from G F , whence A's success probability is the same as in real life. Note that if A has success, we can write x d j as
Now note that the set of x i 's contains no information about j, whence the probability that d j 6 = 0, given that A has success, is at least equal to 1=(k + 1).
Remark 1 It is clear that the protocol constructed in the proof above can be modi ed to have any challenge length desired by having more x i -values.
Enlarging the challenge length in this way will be more e cient than using Theorem 2.
Examples of possible one-way group homomorphisms are the RSA functions, squaring modulo a composite number, or discrete exponentiation modulo a prime, or on an elliptic curve.
It would be natural to try to generalize the result to any random selfreducible problem. It is known that a random self-reducible problem has a protocol that is in our terminology a quasi-signature protocol 16]. It is not clear, however, how to get longer challenges based only on the selfreducible property. But if in addition we assume we have a family of collision intractable hash functions we can use the compression properties of the hash functions to build a signature protocol. Brie y, a family of collision intractable hash functions H is a family of easily computable compression functions, such that it is easy to select a random function with output length k but computationally infeasible to nd collisions for such a function with probability non-negligible in k.
Since, however, quasi-signature protocols are not assumed to be special honest veri er zero-knowledge (only honest veri er zero-knowledge), we need the following technical lemma before going any further.
Lemma 1 Let P be honest veri er zero-knowledge and collision-intractable over R and G. Then P can be compiled into a protocol P (for relation R and generator G), that is also collision-intractable over R and G but that additionally satis es special honest veri er zero-knowledge.
Proof: The claimed protocol works as follows. The prover has access to (x; w) 2 R, while the veri er has access to x. Let k be a security parameter, let l = poly(k), and let f0;1g t be the set of admissible challenges in P. i jjb 0 i ; r 0 i ) are two accepting conversations in P for the same public string x, with i jjb i 6 = 0 i jjb 0 i . We conclude that P is collisionintractable over R and G.
The special simulator S for P runs P's simulator S as a subroutine, and is de ned as follows. Run S 2l times. At the end, there are certainly l conversations that have challenges with the same least signi cant bit, "0" or "1". By the properties of S, these events are equally likely to occur. If we repeat this procedure poly(k) times, the probability that all resulting blocks of l conversations have the same \parity" is equal to 1 2 poly(k) . So, with overwhelming probability two blocks of l conversations are output, one of which has "0" as the least signi cant bit for all its l conversations, while the other has "1". Therefore, if S receives a challenge (b 1 ; : : : ; b l ) 2 f0;1g l as input, together with the public string x, it can output an accepting conversation (in P ) with (b 1 ; : : : ; b l ) as the challenge in polynomial time with overwhelming probability, by just selecting, for each b i , a conversation from the corresponding block. Furthermore, it is clear that the honest veri er in P receives l conversations from P where each of these conversations is according to conversations with an honest veri er in P. By construction, it is clear that S does the same: using simulator S to select honest veri er conversations in P according to the least signi cant bit in the challenge, while the selection is according to uniform bits.
Theorem 4 Suppose there exists a quasi signature protocol P for relation R and generator G and that a family H of collision intractable hash functions exists. Then there exists a signature protocol P for R H and G H . Here R H consists of pairs ((x; h); w) where (x; w) 2 R, w is of length k bits and h 2 H has output length k. The generator G H runs G to generate (x; w) and then selects h 2 H with the desired output length. Proof: First note that by Lemma 1, we may assume that P is special honest veri er zero-knowledge. Then observe that a repetition of P in parallel is trivially a quasi signature protocol. Moreover, from any quasi signature protocol, we can always construct a new one with any smaller challenge length by letting the prover choose part of the challenge. Hence we may without loss of generality assume that C P = k + 1. Let t = A P + 1. Then protocol P goes as follows: 1. The prover sends a rst message a to the veri er computed as in P.
2. The veri er sends t random bits b 1 ; : : :; b t .
3. The prover sends t conversations in P, (a i ; c i ; r i ); i = 1; : : : ; t. 4 . The veri er checks that a = a 1 , that all conversations are accepting conversations, and that c i = b i jjh(a i+1 ) for i = 1; : : : ; t ? 1, and that c t = b t jj0jj jj0.
It is easy to verify that this protocol has all the required properties. (see the proof of Theorem 2). In particular, collision intractability can be proved observing that a collision for P would imply either a collision for P or for h. 2
We have chosen to use in the above theorem a whole family of hash functions (in stead of a single xed function) because this ts into our theoretical model. In practice, many hash functions do not come from a family but have a xed description, such as MD4 or SHS. Our construction will also work with one xed hash function, and the argument that a successful enemy would have to break either the hash function or the quasi signature protocol would be the same as before.
Claw-Free Pairs of Trapdoor One-Way Permutations
In 9], a secure signature scheme is exhibited, based on (a family of) clawfree pairs of trapdoor one-way permutations. Informally, a pair of distinct permutations (f 0 ; f 1 ) is called claw-free, if it is hard to compute x and y such that f 0 (x) = f 1 (y). Knowledge of the trapdoor information, however, enables e cient inversion of the permutations and computation of claws. In 9], an example of such a family is given, whose claw-freeness is equivalent to the di culty of factoring Blum-integers.
In the following we will show that the existence of a family of claw-free pairs of trapdoor one-way permutations is a su cient condition for the existence of signature protocols. Moreover, building a signature protocol from a , and it is assumed that the prover P has access to the trapdoor information s.
This protocol satis es the conditions of a signature protocol by standard arguments. We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Suppose F is a family of claw-free pairs of trapdoor one-way permutations. Then there exists a signature protocol for R F and G F .
4 Main Result
We will now present the new signature scheme P , based on a signature protocol P. In Section 5, the following theorem will be proven. Theorem 6 Let P be a signature protocol for relation R and generator G.
Then the signature scheme P is not existentially forgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks.
It is assumed that we are given a signature protocol P for relation R and generator G. By Theorem 2, we may assume that for each security parameter k and for each instance (x; w) as output by running G(1 k ), the (non-constant) polynomial t(k) satis es t = C P 3 A P . The construction of P from P works as follows.
Initialization Phase
Given a security parameter k, the signer uses the generator G to generate two solved instances x 0 and x 1 , with respective witnesses w 0 and w 1 . He also computes (a 
Signing Phase
Let m 2 f0;1g t be the message to be signed and let i 1 = a 1 1 , the receiver has to perform the following veri cations, for j = 2; : : : ; r. Note that, by assumption on the challenge length t(k), 2 A P (x 1 )+A P (x 0 ) t, so the challenges are long enough to encode the strings a 2i 1 jja 2i+1 1 jja i 0 . These strings can be padded up to t bits, if necessary, using standard techniques. As we have also assumed that all occurring values have xed length descriptions (depending only on the corresponding public string), parsing these concatenations is easy.
Proof of Security
Our notion of security for signature schemes is that of 9]. In this section we show that no polynomially bounded adversary can construct a forgery on a message that hasn't been signed by the real signer, even if he is allowed to get polynomially many signatures on messages that he has chosen in an adaptive fashion. We rst brie y outline the proof of Theorem 6. It will be shown that the existence of such a successful forger contradicts the assumption that the protocol P is collision intractable over the generator G. To this end, we compile this successful forger into an attacker that breaks that assumption.
Before proceeding with the proof, we will brie y outline our approach. Let k be a given security parameter. A key-observation is that, for any xed polynomial number, say P(k), of signatures, the signature scheme P can be simulated perfectly and e ciently if one of the two witnesses w 0 and w 1 is discarded right after generation.
Bearing this in mind, we will build a cracking algorithm A which gets a problem instance x (as generated by G) as input, and generates a collision for this instance using the forgery algorithm A as a subroutine. To do this, A builds an instance of P from x and a pair (x 0 ; w 0 ) generated by running G. The public key will be the pair (x; x 0 ), randomly permuted. By the perfectness of this simulation of P , we can run A and handle all its signature requests and expect the same probability of success as in \real life". The proof is then nalized by observing that a successsful forgery leads to a collision for the instance x with probability 1/2.
In the following theorem, it is assumed that we are given a signature protocol P for generator G and relation R. By Theorem 2, we may assume that for each security parameter k and for each instance (x; w) as output by running G(1 k ), the (non-constant) polynomial t(k) satisi es t = C P 3 A P .
Theorem 7 Any probabilistic polynomial time cracking algorithm A that forges a signature on a new message with probability (k), after at most polynomially many calls to a signer, can be compiled into probabilistic polynomial time procedure A that breaks the collision intractability of P over G with probability of the order of (k)). The running time of A is of the same order as the running time of A. Proof: Let a security parameter k be given, and let x be an instance of P generated by G on input 1 k .
We now describe how A cracks the collision intractability of P by using the forger A and the following simulation of P . A receives x as input. A rst runs G on input 1 k in order to obtain a solved instance (x 0 ; w 0 ). Case b = 0: We create an authentication tree with P(k) internal nodes, starting at the leaves. The leaves a j 1 are generated as follows. Case b = 1:
1. Generate (a Note that in both cases the simulation can deal with any signature request, by the properties of the special simulator S. Furthermore, the distribution of the a i 0 , r i 0 , a i 1 and r i 1 is always according to the honest signer who has access to both w 0 and w 1 , by Theorem 1. Thus the simulation is perfect, and we may now assume that the cracking algorithm outputs a forgery on a new message (i.e, a message that has not been signed by the simulator) m. Without loss of generality, we assume that this happens after exactly P(k) calls, with probability (k). Let (Auth(a 0 ); r 0 ) be the forgery, on a new messagem. Suppose that a 0 = a j 0 for some 1 j P(k), with probability 1 (k). Asm has not been signed by the simulation, we must havem 6 = m j , so A can get a collision for P from (a 0 ;m; r 0 ) and (a j 0 ; m j ; r j 0 ). 1 is an internal node, say with probability 2 (k), we immediately get a collision. If a i 1 is a leaf, with probability 3 (k), however, the probability that a 00 1 jja 000 1 jja 0 0 6 = c i is 1 ? 1 2 t , as the distribution of a i 1 is independent of the distribution of c j (by the properties of the special simulator), and c j was chosen uniformly at random. Thus in this case we get a collision with probability 1 ? 1 2 t . >From the perfectness of the simulation it follows thatthe distribution of everything sent to A is independent of b. Therefore the probability that A can compute a collision for the instance x 1?b = x is
; which is clearly of the same order as (k). Thus we have shown that any forger of the signature scheme P can be turned very e ciently into a cracker of the collision intractibility of P, with essentially the same probability of success.
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Remark 2 Consider the following (potentially) stronger notion of security for signature schemes. Instead of requiring forgery on a new message to be infeasible, one could, more generally, demand that forging a new signature is infeasible. Obviously, this implies that a forger cannot produce a signature on a message that has never really been signed. Additionally, however, it is now infeasible to forge a new signature on a message that has previously been signed. We believe that, from a theoretical viewpoint, this is the proper and most general notion of security for signature schemes. Taking minor changes into account, our proof can easily be accomodated to this (potentially) slightly stronger notion.
Concrete Examples
We now describe a signature scheme whose security is equivalent to the diculty of computing discrete logarithms, by applying our main construction to a suitable transformation of the discrete log based protocol of Schnorr 15] . In its basic form, this is a protocol for proving knowledge of a discrete log in a group G of prime order q. Such a group can be realized, for example as a subgroup of Z Z p , where p is a prime, and q divides p ? 1. Let g 6 = 1, and let x = g w be the common input. P is given w as private input. The protocol is a proof of knowledge for the relation that consists of pairs ( (x; g; G); w) such that x = g w in G. Let k denote the number of bits needed to represent an element of G and let l = blog 2 qc. Then the protocol works as follows: 1. The prover chooses z at random in 0; : : :; q), and sends a = g z to V .
2. The veri er chooses c at random in 0; : : : ; q), and sends it to P. 3 . P sends r = (z + cw) mod q to V , and V checks that g r = a x c .
Completeness trivially holds with probability 1. Correct answers to two di erent c-values give two equations r 1 = z + wc 1 mod q and r 2 = z + wc 2 mod q so we nd that w = (r 1 ?r 2 )=(c 1 ?c 2 ) mod q. Therefore, assuming we generate inputs for the protocol by choosing w at random in G, we have collision intractability provided that it is infeasible to nd w from g w for random w.
Finally, note that by choosing c and r at random, we can make a simulated conversation (g r x ?c ; c; r) between the honest veri er and prover. Since c can be chosen freely, we get special honest veri er zero-knowledge.
Thus this protocol is a quasi-signature protocol. With some modi cations, it can be turned into a signature protocol: we will have as input to the protocol d instances instead of 1, (x 1 ; w 1 ); : : :; (x d ; w d ), where x i = g w i .
Then the new protocol P goes as follows:
P is completed when the public key of the signer, (x; x; a 1 1 ), is placed in the public directory.
We will now show how the signer computes the rst signature on a mes- We get signatures of length O(k) bits, where k is the number of bits needed to represent an element in G. Moreover, one authentication step requires a constant number of exponentiations in G, both for signing and veri cation. Note that the 1 exponentiation needed from the signer uses input independent from the bits authenticated (c 1 ; : : :; c d ). Therefore we can use the idea suggested by Schnorr of having the signer can precompute this exponentiation if some idle time is available on his computer. This way the on-line time to generate a signature becomes almost negligible. Previously, the only known way to get a signature scheme provably secure based on discrete log was to use the method from 4] to build a collision intractable hash function and then use Merkle's construction. This would require an exponentiation for each bit processed in the hashing, and moreover we would need as a part of the signature a full preimage under the hash function to authenticate 1 bit. Therefore we would get signatures of length O(k 2 ) bits and would need O(k 2 ) exponentiations to make a signature.
Conclusion
We have shown that the existence of signature protocols is a su cient condition for the existence of signature schemes that are not existentially forgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks, which is the strongest notion of security for signature schemes (see 9]). The length of the signatures in our schemes grows logarithmically in the number of signatures. In addition to the existence of claw-free pairs of trapdoor one-way permutations, on which the scheme from 9] is based, the most general computational assumption we have been able to nd, su cient for the existence of signature protocols, is the existence of one-way group homomorphisms. As an example, we have presented a signature scheme whose security is equivalent to the di culty of computing discrete logarithms.
